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ABSTRACT
Downey, Kyle A., MS Pharmacy Administration, June 1999
Cost-Shifting Among Rural Montana Independent Community Pharmacies (65 pp.)
Director: Timothy P. Stratton, Ph.D., R.Ph.
Cost-shifting is a familiar term within the health care community and is commonly
associated with hospitals. Many other health care providers, including pharmacists, have
been affected by the practice. With the number of patients covered by third-party
programs continuing to increase, cost-shifting is one of pharmacy’s many complex issues.
The goal of the study was to determine if Montana Independent Retail Pharmacies
engage in third-party induced cost-shifting. Costs of dispensing prescriptions by study
pharmacies and drug costs were compared to the reimbursement rates for three different
groups of prescription patients: cash customers, Montana Medicaid customers and
Express Scripts customers (a third-party carrier for University of Montana employees).
Data were collected from six Independent pharmacies throughout Montana. Information
was collected on 100 consecutive private pay prescriptions for each of the stores Using
pricing formulas supplied by the pharmacy managers, gross reimbursements were
calculated for each of the same prescriptions as if they had been dispensed to Montana
Medicaid or Express Scripts patients. A breakeven all-payer price was determined for
each prescription consisting of the acquisition cost of each drug and the cost o f dispensing
the prescription. Cost-shifting occurs if a significant difference exists between the mean
price for each group of prescriptions and if one or more payer group(s) are reimbursing
below the all-payer price.
All study pharmacies were located in rural areas with populations less than 25,000. A
total of 596 prescriptions were analyzed. The average cost of dispensing a prescription
among study pharmacies was determined to be $6.12 (+/- $0.85SD). Third-party prices
were calculated using formulas based on Average Wholesale Price (AWP), utilizing
Maximum Acquisition Cost (MAC) for certain generic drugs. Combining prescriptions
from the six stores (n=596), $0,90 per prescription was found to be shifted from Express
Scripts (one of many third-party programs) to cash paying customers for the same
prescription. Five cents of the charge for each cash prescription may be directly attributed
to the Express Scripts program.
As the number o f patients being covered by third-party payers increases, the ability to
cost-shift to cash paying patients will diminish. By accepting contracts below the cost of
dispensing a prescription, independent pharmacies risk losing money by serving patients
whose prescriptions are covered by third-party payers. To soften the burden, on average,
the independent pharmacies in this study cost-shift to their private pay patients.
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EVTRODUCnON
Are third party prescription programs unjust? While the beneficiaries of many
third party programs are relatively affluent, many private pay patients are less financially
secure. This latter group includes the elderly on fixed incomes, the self-employed, the
underinsured and the uninsured Prescription reimbursement policies of third party payers
cause increased costs from dispensing third party prescriptions (Huey et al, 1995). If
these reimbursement policies cause pharmacies to charge more to private pay patients,
then cost-shifting is occurring. In the present study, whether cost-shifting is occurring and
the extent to which the costs are redistributed to private pay patients in a sample of rural
Montana independent pharmacies was examined.
Cost-Shifting
Cost-shifting is a familiar term within the health care community. The practice has
been used and associated with hospitals for many years (Ginsburg et a l, 1984; Johnson et
al., 1984; Duncan, 1992). Many other health care providers, including pharmacists, have
also been affected by the practice (Rice et al, 1996; McMillan et al, 1990). In pharmacy,
the prevalence of cost-shifting has increased over the past several years and is predicted to
continue to do so (McMillan et al, 1990). With an increasing proportion of prescriptions
paid for by third parties, cost-shifting is one of the most important and controversial issues
pharmacy will have to face in the immediate future.
As defined in the hospital industry, cost-shifting is "the practice by a hospital of
charging more to one group of patients because another group is not paying its share of
the costs of hospital care (Johnson et a l, 1984)." This definition of cost-shifting can be
applied to any business which charges consumers different prices for the same service

where the discount given results in reimbursements falling below the cost of providing that
service. Thus, cost-shifting is a form of price discrimination (Cohodes, 1984).
Price Discrimination
Price discrimination occurs when a producer of a product charges different prices
for an identical product. An example of price discrimination is the charging of different
admission prices to the same movie. The higher price elasticity (sensitivity) of senior
citizens and students makes it a good strategy to charge lower prices to these groups to
attract more people into the theater (Frank, 1991). If more seats are being filled during
each show, then the theater is adding to the revenue taken in for a particular movie.
Three conditions must apply for a producer of goods and services to engage in
price discrimination (Carlton et al., 1990). First, the producer must have some market
power, otherwise he/she will not be able to charge more than the competitive price.
Second, the producer must be able to predict the consumer's willingness to pay and that
willingness to pay must vary across consumers. Third, the producer must be able to
prevent or limit the resale of products from customers who pay the lower price to those
who pay the higher price All three of these conditions are met in the health care sector.
When producers of goods set high prices for a service and simultaneously offer discounts
to certain customers, such as patients on government programs or those with insurance,
price discrimination occurs.
Pharmacy Market
Pharmacies engage in price discrimination by fulfilling the three conditions. In the
case o f the retail pharmacy, most pharmacies have some degree of market power. The
loyalty of patients who frequent the pharmacy is an excellent example. In addition, the

number of pharmacists in a community as well as the high overhead o f opening a
pharmacy often limit the number of pharmacies in a specific area All of these conditions
lead to pharmacies having some degree of market power.
Second, pharmacies are rather easily able to predict patients’ willingness to pay.
The patient market is split for the pharmacy into those patients who pay directly for their
prescriptions, those who participate in third-party programs and those who participate in
the Medicaid program.
Finally, resale of prescription products firom the lower price group to those who
pay the higher price is prevented through many avenues. First of all, federal law prohibits
the use of prescription products by persons for whom they are not prescribed. The sheer
numbers of products which physicians prescribe make resale difficult and patients trust
that products are not adulterated through the pharmacy, which may not be the case
through resale. Trust and confidence that the products are safe and effective is probably
the primary reason more resale does not occur.
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
A firm without enough information to identify what each customer is willing to pay
is unable to extract all of the customer surplus. However, if a firm can determine whether
a customer falls into a particular group and it knows the different aggregate demand
curves for each group (demand elasticity), different prices may be charged to each group.
This is known as third-degree price discrimination (Carlton et al., 1990). Different
consumers face different per-unit prices. An example follows where high transaction costs
may prevent resale and enable a firm to charge consumers in California higher prices than
those in New York.

Imagine a product sold both in California and New York (Figure 1). Letting the
subscripts 1 and 2 stand for customer groups in California and New York, respectively, P
for price, Q for quantity demanded and MC for marginal cost, the monopolist looks to
maximize profits by the following equation:
(Pi-MC) Qi + (P2-MC) Qz = Profits.
By charging a higher price in California compared to that of New York, the monopolist
will separately maximize profits from groups 1 and 2. This is graphically illustrated in
Figure 1.

FIGURE 1: Third-Degree Price Discrimination
P - Price
Q - Quantity
D - Demand
MR - Marginal Revenue
MC - Marginal Cost

Group 2
Group 1

MC

Q

Group 2

Q

Group 1

Price Discrimination vs. Cost-Shifting
Every seller would like to practice perfect price discrimination and maximize the
revenue the firm receives. However, if it costs more to serve a particular group of

customers, it is misleading to interpret all price differences as price discrimination (Carlton
et al., 1990). If a business is losing money on one group of customers, it may be able to
increase prices to another group to recoup the losses; this practice would be cost-shifting.
Price discrimination and cost-shifting both involve charging different prices to
different payers for the same service, but the theories have different origins (Rosko et al.,
1994). Price discrimination is developed from the neoclassical model of the profitmaximizing, surplus maximizing or cost-minimizing firm. It predicts that a profitmaximizing seller setting its price in the private market and facing a lower governmentregulated price in another market, will react by not cost-shifting, or by even possibly
lowering the private market price to shadow the government regulated price. In contrast,
cost-shifting is viewed as a survival response. With price reductions from government or
other payers, the firm will react by increasing private market prices. Thus, it is predictable
that hospitals with different objectives (profit maximization vs. utility maximization) will
behave differently (Hoerger, 1991).
Cost-shifting is therefore dependent on where the hospital’s prices start to
determine whether it occurs. If a discount is being offered to one group of consumers
below the costs of that firm and another group of consumers is off-setting that discount
with increased prices as a surplus, then cost-shifting is present. This is graphically
illustrated in Figure 2.
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FIGURE 2: Cost-Shifting
A) Profit-Maximizing Hospital

PQDC-

Price
Quantity
Demand
Cost

Group 2

- Net Liability
- Surplus

Group 1

Q

Group 2

Q

B) Cost Minimization Hospital

Group 1

P - Price
Q - Quantity
D - Demand
C —Cost

Group 2

- Net Liability
- Surplus

Group 1

Q2' Q2

Q

Group 1

In the profit-maximizing hospital, if the price starts at Pi, then a decrease in group
2’s price from Pi to Pi (A to B) will not invoke the hospital to change the price of group
1. Thus revenue will be extracted from the hospital’s surplus profits (A to C) and costshifting does not occur. However, circumstances of the cost minimization hospital are

entirely different. If the price starts at Po, just covering its costs o f operation, and group
2’s price is lowered from ?o to P 2 (A to B), then the hospital is forced to increase the
prices Po to

Pi

(A to

D)

to group

1,

creating cost-shifting. The amount of the surplus

must at least be equal to the net liability. If the price to group

1

is not increased, then the

hospital’s costs will be greater than its revenue and it will be forced to close.
A third situation may arise where customers in group
Po

1

are being charged a price

above the cost of the product but below that of the monopoly price (Figure 3). Group

2’s price is then reduced from Po to

P2

(A to

B ).

Therefore, the lightly-shaded area

represents the liability the hospital has for selling to the consumers in group 2. If the net
liability is greater than the surplus, cost-shifting occurs to offset the liability, increasing
group I ’s price from Po to
in group

1

P% (A

to

D ).

The increased surplus generated by the customers

offsets the liability from the customers in group 2, Otherwise the hospital will

be forced out of business when its costs exceed its revenue.
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FIGURE 3: Cost-Shifting Below Monopoly Price
PQDC-

I
Group 2

I

IS

Price
Quantity
Demand
Cost

- Net Liability
- Surplus

Group 1

Group 2

Q

Group 1

Cost-Shifting bv Hospitals
Price discrimination is used to explain hospital cost-shifting (Folland et al., 1997),
Two types of hospitals exist in the United States, profit and not-for-profit institutions.
The majority of hospitals are not-for-profit (or non-profit). These institutions are looking
to maximize other objectives, such as the ‘Svelfare” of the community or the labor force
which they employ.
Assume that hospitals maximize profits, or for non-profit institutions, hospitals
maximize some other objectives (utility). In addition, assume that two groups of patients
exist, private (insured or self-pay) and Medicare. A downward sloping demand curve will
be employed for the private sector and a constant rate for Medicare reimbursement
(Figure 4). Private pay patients will economize or substitute services as their out-of-
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pocket expenses increase, justifying the downward-sloping demand curve. So when a
hospital raises its fees patients will search for alternative treatments, go to a different
hospital or simply purchase less hospital care. Medicare reimbursement is received by the
hospitals in two forms, that of fixed costs and variable costs. Fixed costs are received on
a yearly basis based upon the hospital’s size and do not vary with the quantity of patients
treated. Variable costs are reimbursed based on diagnostic related groups (DRGs) for
services provided for each patient. Here variable costs are used to assess cost-shifting

FIGURE 4: Changes in Hospital Medicare Rates

Pi

P - Price
Q - Quantity
D - Demand
MR - Marginal Revenue
C —Cost
R - Medicare Rate

Ri
R2

Cl

Cl

MR

Q2
A: Private Sector

B: Medicare Sector

Suppose that Ri covers the average variable cost (Ci) for a certain number of
Medicare patients seeking admission (Q2 ) as shown for the Medicare sector, but the rate
does not necessarily cover all costs. Finally, the hospital is operating below capacity and
Cl is constant over the relevant range and is also equal to the marginal cost. If the hospital
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cannot price discriminate in the private sector, then it will accept Qi private sector patients
(where marginal revenue equals marginal cost) and set the price at Pi. It will also accept
all Medicare patients at a rate of Ri so the hospital will treat a total of Qi + Q2 patients.
Therefore, total revenues of PiQi + R 1Q2 create a surplus over variable cost of (Pi -Ci )Qi
+ (Ri-Ci)Q2.
Assume the Medicare reimbursement rate is lowered to R 2 but that rate is still
above the average variable and marginal cost This will allow the hospital to still accept
Q 2 Medicare patients. However, it will not be beneficial for the hospital to increase the
price in the private sector. Hospital surpluses will diminish at prices above Pi due to loss
of private sector patients whose marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost (monopoly
price). The optimal pricing rate remains at Pi for Qi private patients and cost-shifting will
not occur.
Cost-shifting may arise in the model if the hospital was not previously maximizing
profits (this is, if the hospital were a cost-minimizing hospital), accepting patients whose
marginal revenue fell short of marginal costs (Poland et al., 1997). Hospitals not
maximizing profits (typically non-profit institutions) are those which are maximizing
another utility, such as the ‘Velfare” o f the community. Accepting a lower Medicare rate
would induce the hospital to reduce the number of private pay patients by raising the
private sector price.
In either case the hospital’s revenues and surplus will be reduced. If the hospital is
able to cost-shift, only part of the lost surplus will be recuperated. Over the long run,
revenues must cover aU costs, otherwise the hospital will not be able to survive If after
lowering the Medicare payment rate the hospital’s revenues still exceed its costs, then no
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effect on the private sector price should be seen in the long run. However, that will not be
the case if the hospital’s costs exceed its revenue in the long run. The hospital which
cannot reduce its costs and cannot increase revenues by cost-shifling will either be forced
out of business or forced to merge. As consolidation and closure occurs patients will have
fewer hospitals from which to choose, shifting outward the demand for the remaining
hospitals until private pay rates can cover the total long-run subsidy of Medicare patients.
Three important points should be taken from hospital cost-shifting. First,
participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs for hospitals is, for all intents and
purposes, involuntary. Medicare provides coverage for such a large percentage of a
hospital’s potential market, that hospitals must take these patients regardless of the
reimbursement rate. If that rate falls below the hospital’s costs which the hospital has
already minimized, then cost-shifting is engaged as a survival tactic.
Second, cost-shifting is dependent upon where the costs are set before the price
reduction to a particular group is made. If the hospital is a monopolist or profitmaximizer, then cost-shifting does not occur and revenue is extracted from the hospital’s
surplus. However, if the hospital is maximizing other objectives such as the *"welfare” of
the community and setting its prices below the monopoly price to begin with, then costshifting may be employed in the presence of decreasing Medicare or Medicaid
reimbursement.
Finally, there is a limit to the price reductions to any specific group of patients.
When the net liability o f a group exceeds the maximum surplus of the other group, then
the hospital can either reduce costs or go out of business. The former may lead to a
decrease in the quality of services provided or the number of services available to patients.
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Research Question
Pharmacy cost-shifting has not been assessed in Montana With the increasing
number of third-party programs entering the pharmacy market, cost-shifting is a
worthwhile question to be addressed.
The preceding discussions of cost-shifting and third-degree price discrimination
lead to the question to be asked of Independent Retail Pharmacies in this study: Are
increased prices being charged to cash-paying patients in the presence of low
reimbursement fi’om third-party payers (creating cost-shifting), or are third-party
reimbursement policies adequate to cover the pharmacies’ costs?
Hospital cost-shifting is used as the basic framework for the analysis of costshifting in pharmacy. The common thread which relates hospital and pharmacy costshifting is that both follow the same principles of price discrimination, as described above.
However, the major difference between the two is that cost-shifting by hospitals is
involuntary Every hospital must serve Medicare and Medicaid patients. In contrast,
pharmacies may choose not to participate in any third-party programs, if desired.
Pharmacy cost-shifting is then voluntary due to the fact that pharmacies choose to
participate in Medicaid and third-party programs and are not obligated to do so by law.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A manual literature search was conducted at The University of Montana using
International Pharmaceutical Abstracts (IPA), and electronic searches were performed
using Medline, Business Index and the Academic Index. “Cost-shifting” was used as the
primary search term, with additional search terms being introduced as needed.
Few articles were produced in the field of pharmacy. However, a broad range of
articles discussing cost-shifting in the hospital sector were identified In this paper, a
review of cost-shifting in the hospital sector will provide a fi-amework for analyzing costshifting in Independent Retail Pharmacy. In addition, physician cost-shifting and past
research on pharmacy cost-shifting will be reviewed.
Cost-Shifting in the Hospital Industry
In the hospital sector, cost-shifting has been analyzed in many forms since the early
1980s. Debates continue over whether the phenomenon actually occurs and if specific
consumers are charged excessive prices to compensate for those who do not pay for the
full cost of their care. Cost-shifting in hospitals was explored in depth in the early 1980s
(Ginsburg & Stone, 1984; Johnson et a l , 1984; Duncan, 1992). The realization that a
tiered pricing structure granted large discounts to preferred customer bases along with the
increasing costs of health care brought awareness to the issue. For the year 1981, costshifting in the hospital industry was estimated to be $4.8 billion, as estimated by the Health
Insurance Association of America (Ginsburg & Stone, 1984). Low reimbursement rates
from Medicare and Medicaid programs caused hospitals to charge some third-party and
cash-paying patients more to cover the nonreimbursed costs of caring for Medicare and
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Medicaid patients. Accelerating this cost-shifting phenomenon was the establishment of
the prospective-payment system for Medicare (Ginsburg & Stone, 1984).
Cost-shifting was analyzed in 26 community and public hospitals in the Twin-Cities
metropolitan area fi-om 1981 to 1982 (Johnson et al, 1984). The average hospital had
10,804 admissions and provided 78,120 days of care. The cost-shift was based upon
discounts offered as a percentage of billed charges increasing from $40 million in 1981 to
$63 million in 1982 (1981 adjusted dollars). The shift was primarily due to Medicare and
Medicaid patients but was also associated with the presence of a large Health Maintenance
Organization in the area.
Duncan (1992) discusses the history of cost-shifting from the perspective of
uncompensated care. Uncompensated care is unevenly distributed among providers,
creating cost-shifting. The shifted costs are moved primarily to third-party payers but also
to that of Medicare and Medicaid payers.
Prior to the advent of managed care and capitation, insurers paid hospitals in one
of three ways (Ginsburg & Stone, 1984): pay the total amount charged by the hospital;
reimburse what they determined to be the hospital’s legitimate incurred costs (these
included insurance firms with market power), or specify in advance the amount they would
pay for a specific procedure. Insurers who reimburse on costs or a prospective payment
plan are responsible for most of the cost shifting for three primary reasons (Ginsburg &
Stone, 1984). All three activities lead the hospital to collect payments below the costs of
performing procedures, adding increasing pressure to shift costs.
The first reason is the limitation of cost-finding accounting systems which allocate
costs among different patient groups These systems attempt to determine the proportion
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of hospital costs attributable to each insurer, but the extensive resources required for
detailed reporting limits the accuracy of these data. The second reason prospective
payment systems induce cost-shifting is the unwillingness of insurers to pay for charitable
hospital activities. Care for uninsured patients accounts for a large share of payment
differentials. Hospitals provide charity care to those who are unable to pay their bills.
The final reason for cost-shifting is the prudent purchasing policies of insurers.

Insurers

only pay costs which they consider “reasonable.” For example. Medicare and Medicaid
do not pay a return on equity to not-for-profit hospitals because some equity is donated.
As philanthropic and government grants have become scarce and costs are not covered by
Medicare and Medicaid, revenue differentials arise (Ginsburg & Stone, 1984).
There are differing opinions as to whether cost-shifting really occurs in the realm
of hospital industry (Morrisey, 1995; Cohodes 1984). Critics contend that cost-shifting
plays only a very minimal role in the hospital market. The real debate arises over whether
hospitals are being reimbursed above their costs for providing services to patients. If
hospital costs exceed the rates at which they are being reimbursed, they are forced into a
survived tactic of shifting costs to other patients.
In a review article, Morrisey (1995) analyzes the empirical evidence of costshifting. Early studies showed cost-shifting as private prices increased by 50 cents for
each dollar decreased government spending (1981-83 data) and also by 90 cents (1979
data). However, a more recent study analyzing 1983 Blue Cross payments found that in
the presence of fixed pricing by Medicare, Blue Cross saved money. This was taken as
evidence that no cost-shifting was occurring.
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Cohodes (1984) states that the extent of cost-shifting has been overestimated. His
analysis proposes that the cost-shifting has been based upon charges and not the actual
costs by the hospitals in the early 1980s. He does admit that cost-shifting exists but
questions to where the costs are being shifted and the extent to which shifting actually
occurs.
Government and private not-for-profit hospitals behave differently than for-profit
hospitals (Hoerger, 1991). During periods of large changes in reimbursement policy
(1983 to 1988), individual not-for-profit and government hospitals experienced
significantly lower variations in profits than similarly-sized for-profit hospitals. For-profit
hospitals operate near the peak of their profit fimction and therefore their profits reflect
the full effects of fluctuations in reimbursement rates. Conversely, not-for-profit and
government hospitals operating below their peak profit functions were able to cost-shift to
maintain their profits. As discussed earlier, this behavior depends upon where the
hospitals’ prices begin (refer to Figure 3). If a for-profit hospital is already charging the
monopolist price then there is no incentive to cost-shift. Conversely, not-for-profit
hospitals have an incentive to cost-shift to increase revenue in the presence of decreasing
Medicare prices.
Cost-shifting may take the form of increases in prices to private patients, but
adjustments may occur to keep the price to private patients constant. A hospital may
reduce its quality or cut back on its provision o f free care. Changes in the diversity of
services the hospitals provide may arise. A labor change may occur as one example,
resulting in fewer registered nurses being available to patients, which reduces the
hospital’s costs Poorer care may be given and these costs are absorbed by the patients.
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Cost-Shifting Among Private Practice Physicians
Cost-shifting among physicians has been evaluated briefly over the last few years.
Rice et al. (1996) examined surgical procedures to determine whether physicians raised
the rates charged to their privately insured patients in response to Medicare reductions in
1989 and 1990. Data were examined from 1988 to 1991 before each reduction in
Medicare reimbursement rates. No increase was seen in excess private charges (patients’
out-of-pocket expenses not paid by private insurers) nor in the average billed charges
(reimbursement paid by insurance for privately insured patients) obtained by physicians.
Thus the authors concluded that no evidence existed for cost-shifting by physicians.
Showalter’s study (1997) concluded much the same. Physician data from the
'"Physicians’ Practice Costs and Income Survey” conducted from 1983 to 1985 were
examined The author concludes that in response to lower Medicaid reimbursement rates,
physicians actually lowered their charges. By doing this physicians were looking to
maximize their revenues by attracting more private-pay and private-insured patients to
offset lower Medicaid revenues. This finding contradicts what cost-shifting would
anticipate. Rather than raise prices charged to non-Medicaid patients as predicted by a
cost-shifting model, physicians could increase their profits by lowering their charges to
attract more non-Medicaid patients. In addition, physicians tended to treat fewer
Medicaid patients in response to lower Medicaid reimbursement rates.
Physicians look to maximize their profits by treating more patients at a lower
reimbursement rate. As represented in Figure 5, physicians can lower their prices from Pi
to P2 and thereby increase the number of patients they treat from Qi to Q2 . By lowering
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their prices and thereby treating more private-pay patients, physicians can maximize their
profits as represented by the shaded area

FIGURE 5: Physician Profit Maximization

P - Price
Q - Quantity
D - Demand
C - Cost
MR - Marginal Revenue
□

- Profit

MR

Q

Not analyzed in these studies is the obvious evidence of physicians accepting
different rates of reimbursement. If any o f these reimbursement rates were below the
costs of doing business then costs may be shifted to another group of patients. This type
of finding would be evidence for cost-shifting.
Cost-Shifting among Retail Pharmacies
In the retail pharmacy industry, cost-shifting has been studied very little. In the
1990s three articles were written relating to the subject. The latest calculation of costshifting in the price of prescriptions was done in Georgia pharmacies (McMillan et al.,
1990). Cost-shifting was calculated in both Independent and Chain pharmacies. Chain
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pharmacies engaged in a larger cost-shift to the private pay patient than did the
Independent pharmacies, although both sectors were engaged in the practice. Chains
shifted an average of $0.49 per prescription to private pay customers while Independents
shifted an average of $0.30 per prescription. The cost-shifting in the chains largely
resulted from dealings with private third-party plans, and with Medicaid among the
independents.
Pharmacies have been shown to incur extra expense dispensing third-party
prescriptions compared to private pay prescriptions (Huey et al., 1995; Carroll, 1991).
Huey et al. examined 10 independent pharmacies in the Atlanta area. The extra expense
incurred fi’om dispensing third-party prescriptions totaled $1.02 per prescription.
Furthermore, a comparison of third-party reimbursements with the pharmacies’ usual
prices to cash patients revealed decreases of $2.71 per prescription. Huey and coworkers
note that these increased costs were not compensated for by nonprescription purchases
made by third-party customers.
Carroll’s 1991 study involved a larger sample of 35 independent Virginia
pharmacies. He determined the added cost of dispensing a third-party prescription to be
$1.55. Of the total, $1.47 was attributed to third-party related personnel expenses and
$0.08 in claim submission costs. The two studies provide ample evidence o f increased
costs for dispensing a third-party prescription. Simultaneously, pharmacies are receiving
less revenue for dispensing third-party prescriptions compared with revenue from privatepay patrons.
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Hypothesis
This study will determine whether or not Montana Independent Retail Pharmacies
engage in third-party-induced cost-shifting. Costs of dispensing prescriptions by study
pharmacies and drug costs will be compared to the reimbursement rates for three different
groups of prescription customers: cash customers, Montana Medicaid customers and
Express Scripts customers. Statistically lower rates of reimbursement for Montana
Medicaid and Express Scripts patients in comparison with cash paying patients, in addition
to evidence that Montana Medicaid or Express Scripts prescriptions are being dispensed at
a loss on average, will be considered evidence of cost-shifting. The amount of cost-shift
to cash paying patients will be quantified with respect to each program.
The null hypotheses are:
(Hoi) No difference exists in the mean net reimbursement rate (dolleir
contribution o f each prescription minus all-payer price) fi'om prescriptions
for cash paying patients, Montana Medicaid patients and patients covered
under the MUS health plan (Express Scripts).
(H aI) The mean net reimbursement rate (dollar contribution of each
prescription minus all-payer price) for prescriptions from cash paying
patients is greater than that from Montana Medicaid patients or from
patients covered under the MUS health plan.
(Ho2) No difference exists in the mean net profit per prescription

(reimbursement rate minus acquisition cost of the drug minus cost of
dispensing) from prescriptions for cash paying patients, Montana Medicaid
patients and patients covered under the MUS health plan.
The mean net profit per prescription (reimbursement rate minus
acquisition cost o f the drug minus cost of dispensing) from prescriptions of
cash paying patients is greater than that from Montana Medicaid patients or
patients covered under the MUS health plan.
(Ha2)

(Ho3) Prescriptions from cash paying patients, Montana Medicaid patients
and patients covered under the MUS health plan are being dispensed above
the all-payer price (not at a loss).
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(HA3) Prescriptions from cash paying patients, Montana Medicaid patients
or patients covered under the MUS health plan are being dispensed below
the all-payer price (at a loss).

The rejection of all three null hypotheses will be considered evidence of cost-shifting
among this sample of Montana Independent Retail Pharmacies.

METHODOLOGY
Pharmacy Selection and Activities
A geographically representative convenience sample of six independent pharmacies
from throughout Montana was recruited into the study. Due to the small number of
pharmacies involved complete randomization could have lead to a geographically
unrepresentative sample. Therefore, study pharmacies were chosen on the basis of
location throughout the state and their willingness to participate in the study.
Participating pharmacies completed data collection worksheets developed for the study
which are described in detail later in this section.
The study was approved by The University of Montana Institutional Review Board
(IRB) and the information obtained from each store has been kept confidential.
Each pharmacy was reimbursed $200 for their time in collecting the data. The
pharmacies selected served both Montana Medicaid patients and Montana University
System (MUS) health plan clients and were willing to peirticipate in the study.
Specific inclusion criteria for each pharmacy were:
1) The pharmacy had to fill at least 75 prescriptions per weekday on
average;
2) At least 10% of the pharmacy's prescription volume had to be covered
by Montana Medicaid;
3) At least 10% of the pharmacy’s prescription volume had to include
other third-party prescription programs and;
4) The pharmacy had to have a computer system capable of segregating
prescription sales and cost data from customers who pay cash for their
prescriptions and data from customers with third-party prescription
coverage.
The 10% prescription volume by Montana Medicaid and third-party payers was
chosen arbitrarily by the investigators.
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Each of the six pharmacies were asked to collect data regarding the cost of
dispensing a prescription in their pharmacy as well as data pertaining to their costs and
reimbursement rates for each cash, Montana Medicaid and Express Scripts prescription.
Also, the demographics of the pharmacy’s patients covered by Montana Medicaid,
Express Scripts, all third party prescription programs and cash paying patients were
collected.
Whether the pharmacies were located in a rural or urban area was determined.
Competition was established by the number of pharmacies located within a 25-mile radius
of each store.
At the beginning of the study period, each pharmacy manager or designee
completed a cost of dispensing data sheet (Appendix 1) based on D C Huffinan’s article
in the February, 1990 issue of the NARD Journal (pp. 20-24). In addition, the pharmacy’s
current third party reimbursement rates from Montana Medicaid and Express Scripts were
collected. The percentages of cash, third-party and Montana Medicaid business were also
reported by each pharmacy.
Next, cash prescription data were collected. Commencing on Day 1 of the study,
the pharmacy manager or designee of the pharmacy manager completed the cash
prescription data sheet (Appendix 2) using 100 consecutive private pay prescriptions.
Each prescription was assigned a number and the following information was collected for
each prescription: the drug name and strength, drug manufacturer, quantity dispensed.
National Drug Code, package size, pharmacy cost per package, the price charged to the
patient and whether the drug was a brand name or generic drug.
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Net Contribution Calculations
Using the above data, the gross reimbursement was tallied for each prescription
and the mean net reimbursement for dispensing a prescription for each pharmacy was
calculated. Using the formulas supplied by the pharmacy managers, gross reimbursements
were calculated for each of the same prescriptions as if they had been dispensed to
Montana Medicaid patients or Montana University System (Express Scripts) patients.
Each pharmacy's cost of dispensing was added to their ingredient cost to arrive at the total
cost for each prescription dispensed. The total cost of each prescription was then
subtracted from the total revenue obtained from that prescription to obtain the net dollar
contribution (net profit) or liability of that prescription. Total contributions for the 100
prescriptions of each pharmacy were tallied. The averaged revenue per prescription for
the pharmacy’s cash, Montana Medicaid, and Express Scripts groups determined if a
positive net profit existed for prescriptions in each payment group. Prescriptions were
then pooled emd analyzed to determine if cost-shifting occurred among the independent
pharmacies as a whole
Cost-Shift Calculations
Cost-shifting determinations were calculated for each pharmacy as well as the
entire prescription set. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to search for differences
in the net dollar contribution for each prescription reimbursement program. An alpha level
of 0.05 was selected by convention to define statistical significance. The ANOVA test
was selected to analyze the data because one dependent variable (difference in net dollar
contribution) was evaluated across three different groups (cash paying patients, Montana
Medicaid patients and Montana University System patients). A significant ANOVA along
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with evidence of a Montana Medicaid or Express Scripts reimbursement rate resulting in a
net liability (i.e. dispensing a prescription below cost) served as evidence for cost-shifting.
Attempts to quantify cost-shifting in the hospital market have defined the cost shift
empirically as the difference between the average price charged to private paying patients
and a hypothetical all-payer rate (McMillan et al., 1990). The all-payer rate is defined as
the single price that, if charged to every customer, would yield the same aggregate
revenue produced by an existing differential pricing/reimbursement structure.
Two assumptions are made in an all-payer analytical framework as applied to
pharmacies (McMillan et al., 1990). The first is that pharmacies can meet target revenues
under an all-payer pricing structure. This is expressed in the following equation:

EQl: (QTP*APP) + (QPP*APP) = TR
QTP - The quantity of third-party prescriptions dispensed;
QPP - The quantity of private-pay prescriptions dispensed;
APP - The all payer price (the single price which if charged to all payers
would generate the target revenue requirement);
TR — The pharmacy’s target revenue.

The second assumption is that pharmacies achieve target revenues by setting
private-pay prices which exceed the all-payer rate by an amount sufficient to balance the
reduced revenue of third-party reimbursement rates below the all-payer price. This is
represented in the following equation:
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EQ2: QTP(OTPP) + QPP * (APP + [QTP (APP - OTPP)J/QPP) = TR
OTP? - The third-party reimbursement rate observed in the market.

In analyzing the all-payer approach, the existence of private-pay prices above that
of the all-payer price has been considered evidence of cost-shifting activity. Differential
prices may also result from a simple lowering of third-party reimbursement rates in the
absence of cost-shifting. So a valid cost-shifting inference depends upon evidence of a
private-pay increase associated with increasing third-party presence. The all-payer
methodology implicitly characterizes this relationship as shown below (McMillan et al.,
1990) by combining the above two equations;

EQ3: OPP = QTP/QPP * (APP - OTPP) + APP
OFF - The observed private-pay market price.

Adjusting the above equation into a gross margin form (reflecting the sales residual
contributing toward operating cost and profit, and which controls price variance due to
different acquisition cost categories) yields the following equation:

EQ4: OPP - AC = QTP/QPP * (APP - TPP) + APP -A C
AC -

Ingredient acquisition cost.

With the above all-payer model, the average gross margin generated from a
private-pay prescription is a linear function of the third-party to private-pay prescription
volume by cost-shifting pharmacies. The slope represents the degree by which the average
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third-party reimbursement falls below an average all-payer price and the intercept equals
the average all-payer margin on prescriptions. So the cost shift premium is given by:

EQ5: OPP - APP = QTP * (APP - TPP)/QPP.

Using the above theoretical basis, a cost shift regression equation was derived
using the private pay price as the dependent variable. This allows searching for evidence
of cost-shifting using a multiple regression model.
In the above equation, the cost shift equals a discount given to third-party patients
(APP-TPP) in relation to the quantity of third-party prescriptions dispensed compared to
that of private pay prescriptions dispensed. The addition of the all-payer price (APP) to
both sides of the equation yields:

EQ6: OPP = [QTP * (APP - TPP)/QPP] + APP.

The private cash price depends upon the all-payer price (APP), the discount
offered to Montana Medicaid and Express Scripts patients (APP-TPP) and a demographic
variable related to the amount of competition each pharmacy (QTP/QPP). The all-payer
price directly relates to the acquisition cost of each prescription; the discount relates to the
reimbursement each pharmacy grants to Montana Medicaid and Express Scripts patients;
and the demographic variable relates the number of competing pharmacies within a 25mile radius of a given study pharmacy.
The all-payer price is the single price that, if charged to all payers (third-party and
private-pay) would meet the target revenue requirement for that pharmacy (McMillan et
al., 1990). As explained later, in the present study the all-payer price was set at each
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store’s breakeven point for dispensing a prescription which is different from McMillan’s
definition based upon target revenue. By setting the all-payer price equal to the cost of
dispensing a prescription (that is, the breakeven point), variations in the target net profits
between stores is removed and cost-shifting can more accurately be assessed.
Accordingly, the existence of private-pay prices above an all-payer price in conjunction
with third-party reimbursement rates below the all-payer price is considered evidence of
cost-shifting.
Using multiple regression, variables associated with pharmacies charging higher
cash prices to dispense identical prescriptions to different patients were determined. The
variables included acquisition cost, Montana Medicaid reimbursement. Express Scripts
reimbursement and a market competition variable. These variables are expressed in the
following equation;

EQ7: CP = a i AC + cut M M + aa EXP +
CP AC —
MM EXP MC C-

MC + C

Private-pay customers charged price;
Acquisition cost of the drug;
Montana Medicaid reimbursement;
Express Scripts reimbursement;
Market competition (number of competing pharmacies in the area);
Constant.

ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The study assumptions include the following:
1) Each study pharmacy dispenses the same types of prescriptions to cash prescription
customers, Medicaid patients and Express Scripts patients.
2) The net profit margin is the same for every prescription dispensed in the study This
assumption controls for the possibility that pharmacies may have products which are
loss leaders, i.e. products with a lower markup and less profit, to entice consumers
into their store.
The study limitations include the following:
1) A search of the state of Montana yielded only six independent pharmacies which
agreed to participate in the study. The analysis was conducted on 600 prescriptions
obtained fi'om these pharmacies, 100 prescriptions fi'om each store. Increasing the
number o f stores along with the number of prescriptions would improve both the
internal and external validity of the study.
2) Cash price data were generated using each pharmacy’s price charged to cash-paying
patients. The reimbursement rates for Medicaid and Express Scripts patients were
derived using reimbursement formulas provided by the participating pharmacies. A
comparison of the reimbursement rates fi'om each payment source for the same
prescription was then conducted. Another, possibly more accurate, approach would
be to collect third-party data directly fi'om the participating pharmacies, rather than use
Express Scripts as a surrogate. Actual third-party prescriptions dispensed to patients
could then be analyzed. Express Scripts was chosen because it is the plan the
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University of Montana employees use and was felt to be representative of all thirdparty prescription plans
3) Independent Retail Pharmacies were analyzed and may serve different clientele than
other sectors o f community pharmacy.
4) The data estimating the cost of dispensing a prescription were all self-reported by the
pharmacists. Data which looked suspicious were verified verbally with the
participating pharmacies, but remained self-reported nonetheless.
5) All of the pharmacies which agreed to participate in the study were fi’om rural
communities. This may lead into question how applicable the results might be to
community retail pharmacies in urban settings.

RESULTS
Pharmacy Characteristics
Only six stores throughout the state of Montana agreed to participate in the study
Being unable to recruit a larger number of independent pharmacies, inclusion criteria were
relaxed to allow all six pharmacies to enroll. The independent pharmacies were located in
rural areas with populations less than 25,000; five of these were located in towns of less
than 10,000 population. Data for 100 private pay prescriptions along with the drug cost
for each prescription were collected from each store. Unusable prescription data for four
prescriptions were discarded and a total of 596 prescriptions were analyzed. The
discarded data included undecipherable information from the cash prescription data sheets.
Pharmacy Reimbursement
The average reimbursement received for dispensing a cash prescription for each
pharmacy is given in Table 1. When the data were analyzed initially. Store 3 reported its
actual cost for the medication and the AWP (Average Wholesale Price) to be the same.
Most pharmacies obtain their medications at a price discounted from AWP. When the
data were combined it appeared that on average this pharmacy was losing money on every
prescription it dispensed. The pharmacy could not do this and stay in business; therefore,
the pharmacy was contacted for clarification of its data.
Apparently the pharmacy indeed obtained its medications fi^om its wholesaler at a
price discounted from AWP and a simple error had occurred The corrected data were
obtained and the analysis continued. Since a mistake in the pharmacy’s reimbursement
forms occurred, a review of this store’s cost of dispensing questionnaire (Appendix 1) was
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also performed. Changes to that questionnaire will be discussed under “Cost of
Dispensing a Prescription.”
Next, the reimbursement that would have been obtained had the same prescription
been dispensed to a Montana Medicaid or Express Scripts patient was calculated for each
prescription. Third-party prices were determined by using the third-party contracted
reimbursement formulas provided by each store for their Medicaid and Express Scripts
prescriptions These formulas are based on Average Wholesale Price (AWP) minus a
percentage plus a dispensing fee. Both third-party carriers also utilize Maximum
Acquisition Costs (MAC) for certain generic drugs which were considered in the
reimbursement scheme. For these generic medications, the insurer only reimbursed a
maximum price for the prescription and did not base reimbursement upon AWP The
average payment per prescription under each reimbursement condition for each store is
shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1: Average Reimbursement Rates for Each Pharmacy
Store
(Number of
Prescriptions)

Average Cash
Prescription Price
(Standard Deviation)

1 (n=100)
2 (n=99)
3 (n=97)
4 (n=100)
5 (n=100)
6 (n=100)

$37.28 ($38.87)
$21,91 ($21.40)
$21.18 ($21.19)
$20.74 ($15.77)
$25.80 ($22.97)
$29.17 ($37.32)

Average Medicaid
Price
(Standard Deviation)
$30.31
$19.59
$19.28
$18.85
$26.27
$25.13

($35.49)
($21.61)
($20.44)
($16.55)
($25.17)
($38.51)

Average Express
Scripts Price
(Standard Deviation)
$28.64 ($34.59)
$17.20 ($20.81)
$17.27 ($19.92)
$16.71 ($16.06)
$23.93 ($24.10)
$23.06 ($37.47)
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Market
The prescription mix was then evaluated for each pharmacy. The percentage of
Medicaid, Express Scripts and total third-party prescriptions filled by each pharmacy is
given in Table 2. The “Total Third-Party Prescriptions” category includes Medicaid and
Express Scripts patients as well as other third party programs in which patients participate
at the pharmacies.
The percentage of patients participating in all third-party programs (excluding
Medicaid) was over 10% in every store. Stores 3 and 6, however, failed to meet the
inclusion criteria for the percentage of Medicaid patients. As stated above, inclusion
criteria were relaxed due to the small number of independent pharmacies willing to
participate. Since the 10% Medicaid prescription volume was chosen arbitrarily, the two
stores were judged to fill an adequate percentage o f Medicaid prescriptions to Justify their
inclusion. In addition, increasing the sample size was felt to be more important than the
strict adherence to this inclusion criterion.
Competition for each study pharmacy was evaluated using local phone directories
to determine the number of competing pharmacies in the town where each pharmacy was
located. Since every store was located in rural Montana this method was deemed
acceptable to locate competing pharmacies within a 25-mile radius. The number of
competing pharmacies is also given in Table 2.
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TABLE 2: Percentage of Third-Party Prescriptions Filled by Study Pharmacies and
Number of Competing Pharmacies
Store

Total
Percentage
Third-Party
Prescriptions

Percentage
Medicaid
Prescriptions

Percentage
Express Scripts
Prescriptions

Number of
Competing
Pharmacies*

1
18%
2%
1
28%
25%
0
2
55%
3.6%
30%
7%
Greater than 3
3
69%
20%
1
4
35%
1.4%
0
15%
5
35%
2%
50%
9%
5.6%
2
6
* Defined as the number of retail pharmacies within a 25-mile radius of the study
pharmacies.
Cost of Dispensing a Prescription
Each pharmacy completed a worksheet to determine their cost of dispensing a
prescription. Appendix 1 (Huffman, 1990). The mean cost of dispensing a prescription
(+/- standard deviation) for the six independent pharmacies was determined to be $6.12
+/- $0.85. A summary of the cost of dispensing a prescription for each store is given in
Table 3.

TABLE 3: Cost of Dispensing a Prescription for Study Pharmacies
Store

Average Cost of Dispensing a
Prescription

1
2
3
4
5
6
*Based on Huffman (1990)

$6.17
$6.40
$5.77
$6.98
$5,82
$4.61
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An initial analysis of the data for the cost of dispensing a prescription was
conducted, finding that two stores had outlier data. Store 3 had two problems with the
data submitted. First, the acquisition price and actual wholesale price of the drugs were
identical as discussed above. Second, the cost of dispensing a prescription seemed to be
overestimated relative to the other study pharmacies. Both of these mistakes lead to an
appearance that the pharmacy was losing money on every prescription which was being
dispensed, including the cash prescriptions.
A review of the dispensing costs for Store 3 was conducted because an error had
already been detected in its data on reimbursement rates. The original cost of dispensing a
prescription for Store 3 was $6.97, second highest only to Store 4. Upon review of Store
3’s data, it was discovered that the store manager allocated 100 % of his/her time to
dispensing functions in the prescription department, leaving no time for management of
the store. The pharmacy was contacted for a clarification of the data during which the
salary allocated to pharmacists was also discovered to be high (Appendix 1). A change
was made in the percentage of time the pharmacy manager spent dispensing prescriptions
fi'om 100% to 50% of the time and pharmacist salary expenses were reduced from
$63,300 to $53,300. With these changes in the cost of dispensing questionnaire, the
average cost to dispense a prescription was reduced from $6.97 to $5.77 as reported in
Table 3.
In contrast to Store 3, the cost of dispensing a prescription for Store 6 seemed to
be unrealistically low (Table 3). Excluding Store 6, the mean cost of dispensing a
prescription was $6.42 +/- $0.46. The cost o f dispensing a prescription for Store 6 was
well below three standard deviations of the mean from the other five stores. Therefore,

36

the store was contacted for clarification, and the data were determined to be true as
reported. These data were therefore included in the analysis as originally reported.
Using the cost of dispensing a prescription for each pharmacy along with the
acquisition cost for each drug, an all-payer price was calculated for each prescription. The
existence of private-pay prices above an all-payer price in conjunction with third-party
reimbursement rates below the all-payer price was considered initial evidence of costshifi;ing.
Net Reimbursement
The net reimbursement for each prescription was calculated. The net
reimbursement is the gross reimbursement minus the all-payer price (i.e. the store’s break
even point). Again, the all-payer price is the acquisition cost for each drug plus the cost of
dispensing a prescription. The cost of dispensing a prescription varied between each
pharmacy as discussed above.
Using ANOVA, four of the six pharmacies showed evidence of cost-shifting. The
net reimbursement for each of the stores is given in Table 4.
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TABLE 4: Differences in Net Reimbursement*
Store

Net Cash
Reimbursement^

Net Medicaid
Reimbursement^

Net Express
Scripts
Reimbursement^

ANOVA

1
2
3
4
5
6

$8.68
$3.30
$0.85
$1.41
$1.77
$7.81

$1.70
$0.98
($1.04)
($0.48)
$2.25
$3.77

$0.03
($1.42)
($3.05)
($2.62)
($0.09)
$1.70

F = 42 13; 6^= 2; p<0.001
F = 16.37; d f~ 2 \ p<0.001
F = 28 07;
2; p<0.001
F = 15.42; df= 2; p<0.001
F = 1 0 .4 9 ;^ = 2; p<0.001
F = 13.53; # = 2 ; p<0.001

* Net reimbursement = Gross Reimbursement - All-Payer Price (Break-Even Point)
# Represents the same average net reimbursement for 100 prescriptions by different payers

The difference in reimbursement rates between cash, Medicaid and Express Scripts
patients is statistically significant in each of the stores. Cost-shifting occurs in Stores 2, 3,
4 and 5, as these stores incurred losses dispensing Medicaid and/or Express Scripts
prescriptions and had surpluses in dispensing cash and/or Medicaid prescriptions.
Pharmacy Cost-Shift
Due to the small sample size collected fi'om each pharmacy, all of the prescriptions
were combined to determine if cost-shifting was occurring among the study pharmacies as
a whole Across the six stores, $0.90 per prescription is being shifted to cash and/or
Medicaid patients (Table 5).
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TABLE 5: Independent Pharmacy Cost-Shift
Prescriptions

Net Cash
Reimbursement

Net Medicaid
Reimbursement

Net Express
Scripts
Reimbursement

ANOVA

n=596

$3.99

$1.21

($0.90)

F = 9 0 .1 ;df= 2;
p<0.001

Regression Analysis
Inserting data into Equation 7 yielded the following regression results as shown in
Table 6.

TABLE 6: Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable = Cash Price
Stores

C

AC

MM

ES

MC

R^

All Stores

Beta‘S
Significance*

6.29

0.31
p<0.001

-0.19
p=0.068

0.86
p<0 001

-0.02
p=0.077

0.948

1,2, 5 & 6

Beta"
Significance*

5.04

0.28
p<0.001

-0.18
p=0.189

0.88
p<0.001

0.05
p<0.001

0.953

3& 4

Beta"
Significance*

6.93

0.58
p<0.001

-0.23
p=0.091

0.63
p<0.001

-0.03
p=0.092

0.94

1&6

Beta"
Significance*

11.28

0.41
p<0.001

-0.05
p=0 808

0.62
p=0.002

-0.03
p=0.073

0.96

Variables
C - Constant
AC - Acquisition Cost
MM - Montana Medicaid
ES - Express Scripts
MC - Market Competition
a - Standardized Regression Coefficient
b - Level of Significance
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The first regression analysis included data from all of the stores The MM
(Montana Medicaid reimbursement) and MC (market competition) variables in Equation 7
were not significantly correlated to the dependent variable cash price, and therefore drop
out of the equation. Acquisition Cost and Express Scripts reimbursement were found to
be significantly related to the cash price reimbursement. Therefore, Express Scripts
reimbursement greatly influences cash price. Montana Medicaid reimbursement also
influences cash price, but to a much lesser extent than Express Scripts reimbursement
Further analysis was conducted using regression to determine if Montana Medicaid
contributed to cost-shifting in Stores 3 and 4. The first regression looks at Stores 1, 2,5
and 6 where Montana Medicaid reimbursement is above the all-payer price. The results
are shown in Table 6. The removal of Stores 3 and 4 caused the market competition
variable to become significantly correlated to the dependent variable; however, the
Montana Medicaid variable remained non-significant. Likewise, the ANOVA analysis did
not identify a cost-shift fi’om Montana Medicaid in Stores 1, 2, 5 and 6. The next analysis
involved Stores 3 and 4, where the Montana Medicaid and Express Scripts reimbursement
is below the all-payer price. The results appear in Table 6. Here again the significant
variables are Acquisition Cost and Express Scripts. The Montana Medicaid and Market
Competition variables remain non-significant, indicating that cost-shifting is occurring
fi-om Express Scripts and not from Medicaid to the cash paying patients in these stores.
Finally, an analysis was conducted on Stores 1 and 6 where the reimbursement was
above the all-payer price for all groups, indicating the absence of cost-shifting. These
results are also shown in Table 6. Using this model, the Acquisition Cost and Express
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Scripts variables remain significant, while Montana Medicaid and Market Competition are
non-significant.
Correlation
An additional analysis was performed to determine if a correlation existed between
the degree of cost-shifting in each store and the percentage of Montana Medicaid and
Express Scripts prescriptions each store dispensed. No significant correlations were
detected.
Mean Weighted Revenue
To determine if bias was introduced into the study by contacting Stores 3 and 6 a
second time, and to determine the reduction in revenue each pharmacy incurs by serving
Montana Medicaid and third-party patients (represented by Express Scripts), the mean
weighted revenue was quantified for each store’s prescription volume. As displayed in
Table 2, each manager reported the percentage of cash, Montana Medicaid and total thirdparty patients for their store. In Table 7, ‘^hird party” represents all insurance programs
other than Montana Medicaid. This was calculated by subtracting the percentage of
Montana Medicaid patients firom the total percentage of all third party patients. The cash
net reimbursement was multiplied by the percentage of cash patients giving the cash
prescriptions contribution to the weighted revenue for cash prescriptions. The same
process was used for Montana Medicaid and third party prescriptions giving the weighted
revenue for each. The mean revenues were then added together to obtain the weighted
average revenue per prescription for each store
The mean weighted revenue across all stores (Table 7) was compared to the mean
weighted revenue across Stores 1, 2, 4 and 5 (Table 8) who were contacted once. The
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mean weighted revenue and standard deviation are virtually identical. Therefore, no bias
was introduced by contacting Stores 3 and 6.
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TABLE 7: Mean Weighted Revenue (All Stores)
Store 1
Cash
MM
3^*^ Party
Total
Store 2
Cash
MM
3”^Party
Total
Store 3
Cash
MM
3"* Party
Total
Store 4
Cash
MM
3"* Party
Total
Store 5
Cash
MM
3'** Party
Total
Store 6
Cash
MM
3^*^ Party
Total

Net
Reimbursement
$8.68
$1.70
$0.03

Percent
Patients
72%
18%
10%

Weighted
Revenue
$6.25
$0.31
$0.003

Total Revenue
Per Prescription

$6.56
Net
Reimbursement
$3.30
$0.98
($1.42)

Percent
Patients
45%
25%
30%

Weighted
Revenue
$1.49
$0.25
($0.43)

Total Revenue
Per Prescription

$1.31
Net
Reimbursement
$0.85
($1.04)
($3.05)

Percent
Patients
70%
7%
23%

Weighted
Revenue
$0.60
($0.07)
($0.70)

Total Revenue
Per Prescription

($0.17)
Net
Reimbursement
$1.41
($0.48)
($2.62)

Percent
Patients
65%
20%
15%

Weighted
Revenue
$0.92
($0.10)
($0.39)

Total Revenue
Per Prescription

$0.43
Net
Reimbursement
$1.77
$2.25
($0.09)

Percent
Patients
65%
15%
20%

Weighted
Revenue
$1.15
$0.34
($ 0 .02)

Total Revenue
Per Prescription

$1.47
Net
Reimbursement
$7.81
$3.77
$1.70

Percent
Patients
50%
9%
41%

Weighted
Revenue
$3.91
$0.34
$0.70

Total Revenue
Per Prescription

$4.95

$2.43 (+/- $2.70)
M ean Weighted Revenue Stores 1-6 (SD)
Party —All patients using third-party insurance excluding Montana Medicaid
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Table 8; Mean Weighted Revenue (Stores 1, 2, 4 & 5)
Store 1
Cash
MM
3^** Party
Total
Store 2
Cash
MM
3”*Party
Total
Store 4
Cash
MM
3”*Party
Total
Store 5
Cash
MM
3*^ Party
Total

Net
Reimbursement
$8.68
$1.70
$0.03

Percent
Patients
72%
18%
10%

Weighted
Revenue
$6.25
$0.31
$0,003

Total Revenue
Per Prescription

$6.56
Net
Reimbursement
$3.30
$0.98
($1.42)

Percent
Patients
45%
25%
30%

Weighted
Revenue
$1.49
$0.25
($0.43)

Total Revenue
Per Prescription

$1.31
Net
Reimbursement
$1.41
($0.48)
($2.62)

Percent
Patients
65%
20%
15%

Weighted
Revenue
$0.92
($0.10)
($0.39)

Total Revenue
Per Prescription

$0.43
Net
Reimbursement
$1.77
$2.25
($0.09)

Percent
Patients
65%
15%
20%

Mean Weighted Revenue Stores 1-6 (SD)

Weighted
Revenue
$1.15
$0.34
($0.02)

Total Revenue
Per Prescription

$1.47
$2.44 (+/- $2.78)

Mean weighted revenue figures were also used to examine the reduction in total
prescription revenue fi’om serving third-party patients. Without third-party patients,
pharmacists would be reimbursed 100% by cash prescriptions. Subtracting the cash
revenue per prescription from the current total revenue per prescription gives the
reduction in revenue the pharmacy is incurring by dispensing third-party prescriptions.
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On average, the revenue reduction is $1.55 per prescription in this sample of independent
pharmacies as shown in Table 9.
Table 9: Reduction in Total Revenue per Prescription
Store
Store 1
Store 2
Store 3
Store 4
Store 5
Store 6

All Cash
Prescriptions®
$8.68
$3.30
$0.85
$1.41
$1.77
$7.81

Reduction in Revenue
Total Revenue
Per Prescription
Per Prescription*’
$6.56
$2.12
$1.31
$1 99
($0.17)
$1.02
$0.43
$0.98
$1.47
$0.30
$4.95
$2.86

M ean Reduction in Revenue Stores 1-6 (SD)

$1.55 (+/- $0.94)

®Assuming that the maximum cash price was paid for each prescription.
^ Calculated by net reimbursement for cash, Montana Medicaid and third-party
prescriptions times the percentage of cash, Montana Medicaid and third-party
prescriptions, respectively.

DISCUSSION
The mean net reimbursement rate (dollar contribution of each prescription minus
all-payer price) for prescriptions from cash paying patients is greater than that from
Montana Medicaid patients or from patients covered under the MUS health plan (Table
4), rejecting Hoi. It is important to note that these different reimbursement rates are for
dispensing the exact same medications.
The mean net profit per prescription (reimbursement rate minus acquisition cost of
the drug minus cost of dispensing) from prescriptions of cash paying patients is greater
than that from Montana Medicaid patients or patients covered under the MUS health plan
(Table 5), rejecting H*2
Prescriptions from cash patients, Montana Medicaid patients or patients covered
under the MUS health plan are being dispensed below the all-payer price (at a loss),
rejecting Ho3. Because Hoi, Ho2 and Ho3 are rejected, cost-shifting is occurring.
As the number of patients covered by third-party payers increases, the ability to
cost-shift to the cash paying patients will diminish. By accepting contracts below the cost
of dispensing a prescription, independent pharmacies risk losing money by serving patients
whose prescriptions are covered by third-party payers. Cost-shifting has been a way to
operate the pharmacy without losing money. By continuing to serve third-party patients
with low reimbursement rates many pharmacies whose costs exceed reimbursement rates
may forced to go out of business. Rural communities may lose valuable access to what
may be their only source of health care in the local area.
Analyzing the combined multiple regression equations for all of the stores, the
Montana Medicaid reimbursement and Market Competition were not significant variables
45
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in cost-shifting. It was surprising that the Montana Medicaid reimbursement was not
correlated with the cash price. With the additional evidence that the Montana Medicaid
reimbursement was above the all-payer-price suggests that Montana Medicaid costs are
not being shifted from the Medicaid program to the cash paying patient. Another surprise
was that the market competition variable was not significantly correlated to cash price.
One would assume that the less competition the pharmacy had, the higher their prices
would be. This was not the case.
The variables Acquisition Cost and Express Scripts reimbursement were
significantly correlated to cash price for all pharmacies combined. A significant
Acquisition Cost variable was not a surprise; the higher a prescription’s acquisition cost,
the higher cash prices become to the consumer. In assessing the significant Express
Scripts reimbursement, it is logical to assume that the Cash Price and Express Scripts
variables should be correlated. However, in assessing this relationship more closely, it
becomes apparent that every $1.00 paid by a cash-paying patient equates to an $0.86
reimbursement by the Express Scripts patient. Compounded with the evidence that
Express Scripts reimbursement is under the all-payer price is supportive evidence of costshifting. The cost-shift from the Express Scripts patient to the cash paying patient was
determined to be $0.90. So in a general sense, if the same prescription is dispensed to an
Express Scripts patient and a cash paying patient, an average cost-shift of $0.90 results to
the cash paying patient.
The $0.90 per prescription is much greater than the $0.49 cost-shift associated
with third-party payers discovered by McMillan et al. in 1990. As the number of third-
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party payers in the market continues to increase, it is not surprising to see an increase in
the amount of the cost shift over the past eight years.
Further regression analysis was conducted on groups of similar stores’ net
reimbursements in cash, Montana Medicaid and Express Scripts prescriptions. Analyzing
the stores broken down into groups leads to much the same conclusion
In Stores 3 and 4, Montana Medicaid and Express Scripts reimbursements fell
below the all-payer-price leading to their removal of from the first group. This left Stores
1, 2, 5 and 6 for regression analysis. The variables Acquisition Cost and Express Scripts
remained significant and the Montana Medicaid variable non-significant. However, within
the group, differences are apparent. With a positive net reimbursement for all three
markets. Stores 1 and 6 appear not to be cost-shifting. In contrast. Stores 2 and 5 show
cost-shifting from the Express Scripts program to the cash paying patient. However,
when assessing Stores 1 , 2 , 5 and 6 together, it is apparent that Express Scripts is
consistently reimbursing $0.88 for every dollar spent by the cash paying patient,
representing at least price discrimination in these pharmacies.
In addition, the Market Competition variable for this group of stores (1, 2, 5 & 6)
is significant. Surprisingly, the beta coefficient is positive suggesting that as the amount of
competition increases, the cash price increases. The opposite would be expected. As
more competition enters the market, a decrease in the cash price is intuitively predicted.
However, with the small sample size and a relatively small beta coefificient (indicating that
not much of a price change occurs with increased competition), it is difficult to determine
if a difference in price actually exists due to market competition in these four pharmacies.
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Stores 3 and 4 were next combined for analysis. Both stores had negative net
reimbursements for Montana Medicaid and Express Scripts prescriptions; therefore, one
would expect that cost-shifting is occurring from both the Medicaid and Express Scripts
programs in the pharmacies. Somewhat surprisingly, however, cost-shifting was only
found to be occurring from Express Scripts patients to cash paying patients. The variables
Acquisition Cost and Express Scripts were significant, while Montana Medicaid and
Market Competition were not Therefore, cost-shifting is occurring from the Express
Scripts program and not the Medicaid program, even in the presence of reimbursement
below costs for Medicaid.
Finally, Stores 1 and 6 were analyzed because of the presence of net
reimbursements greater than costs for all programs The variables Acquisition Cost and
Express Scripts were significantly correlated to cash price, while Montana Medicaid and
Market Competition were not. One would expect to see the Express Scripts variable to
become non-significant with the reimbursement above that of the all-payer price in both of
these stores in the absence o f cost-shifting. However, cost-shifting may still be occurring
despite Express Scripts reimbursement being above the all-payer price, but conclusive
evidence is lacking. Although one cannot conclude that cost-shifting is occurring at these
stores, price discrimination may still be occurring.
Analyzing the mean weighted revenue per prescription was the final analysis
performed. The average mean weighted revenue for all stores was $2.43 per prescription.
Excluding Stores 3 and 6 from the analysis did not appreciably change the mean and
standard deviation. Therefore, no bias appeared to be introduced by contacting the
respective pharmacies a second time. In addition, the mean reduction in store revenue was
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$1.55 per prescription by serving third-party patients. As independent pharmacies’
revenues decrease in the future, more stores’ reimbursement may fall below the all-payerprice, possibly leading to pharmacies closing and patients losing access to health care.
The tragedy is that patients covered by private third-party insurance are more
likely the people most able to afford to pay for their medications. By shifting costs to
those lacking prescription insurance (the elderly on Medicare and the uninsured not on
Medicaid) a grave disservice is occurring. Those without prescription insurance should
not be made to subsidize discounted prescriptions for insured patients.
In all fairness to the Express Scripts third-party program, it was chosen by
convenience as it serves the employees of the University of Montana. For this study it was
considered to be representative of all third-party plans.

CONCLUSION
Are third-party prescription programs being subsidized by cash paying patients in
Montana? The above analysis compares the reimbursements of cash paying, Medicaid and
Express Scripts for the same prescriptions among a sample of Montana Independent
Pharmacies. The reimbursement rates among these payment mechanisms are significantly
different from one another Qt = 90. \ \ d f =2; p<0.001). Cost-shifting was identified in this
small sample of rural Montana Independent Pharmacies where prescriptions were
dispensed to Express Scripts patients. Cash-paying patients absorbed the shift to subsidize
Express Scripts patients’ discounts.
With third-party reimbursement rates below pharmacies’ costs of dispensing a
prescription, pharmacies have two choices. First, they can shift the losses to their cashpaying customers. Second, they can absorb the losses on third-party prescriptions
dispensed and risk going out of business. As seen in the above pharmacies, all accept
different reimbursement rates for the same prescriptions. Four of the six pharmacies
apparently cost-shift to try and recover the revenue lost by servicing Express Scripts, one
of many third-party prescription coverage programs
When the data were combined for analysis, a general cost shift to the cash-paying
patient seemed to be occurring in the amount of $0.90 per prescription As attributed
specifically to the Express Scripts program, $0.05 per prescription was shifted to the cash
paying patient due to the low volume of Express Scripts patients served by study
pharmacies.
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Future research should include increasing the sample size of the number of
prescriptions in each store being analyzed. In addition, more third-party programs should
be evaluated.
Pharmacists and pharmacies (independent as well as chain) should carefully
evaluate a third-party contract before entering into an agreement. A careful analysis of
each program’s reimbursement rate, assuring that it is above the store’s price of
dispensing a prescription will save the pharmacy’s cash-paying customers the burden of
subsidizing discounts for third-party patients.

52

Appendix 1:
Calculating the Cost of Dispensing a Prescription
(Based on article by DC Huffman, NARD Journal. 1990(Feb); 20-24.)
Obtain the information needed below from your financial statements for your most
recently completed fiscal year Please read through this entire worksheet before filling in
data.
Personnel expenses for one year
A. Pharmacy Manager*
Salary
Benefits
Total compensation charged to prescription department
(Add Line 1 and Line 2)
Estimate average percentage of manager’s time spent
managing prescription department (as opposed to managing
other departments in your store)
Total manager expense (Line 3 X Line 4)

$________ (1)
$________ (2)

$________ (3)

%(4)
$________ (5)

*If you do not utilize a manager, count yourself as the pharmacist manager, and estimate a
reasonable salary and benefits amount you would be paid.
B Pharmacists, clerks, technicians, interns
Salaries
Benefits
Total compensation (Add Line 6 and Line 7)
Estimate average percentage of employees’ time spent
working in the prescription department (as opposed to working
in other departments in your store)
Total pharmacy department employee expense
(Line 8 X Line 9)
Delivery person
Salary
Benefits
Total compensation (Add Line 11 and Line 12)

$________ (6)
$________ (7)
$________ (8)

%(9)

$________ (10)

$________ (11)
$________ (42)
$________ (13)
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Estimate average percentage of delivery person’s time spent in
delivery function (as opposed to completing other duties
in your store)______________________________________________ _______ %( 14)
Estimate % of deliveries which contain at least one prescription

_______ %(15)

Total delivery person expense (Line 13 X Line 14 X Line 15)______ $________ (16)
Custodial services
Salary
Benefits
Total compensation (Add Line 11 and Line 12)
Estimate average percentage of time spent in janitoring
function (as opposed to completing other duties in your store)

$________ (17)
$________ (18)
$________ (19)

_______ %(20)

Enter approximate floor area of prescription department

_______ sq. ft. (21)

Enter approximate floor area of entire store

_______ sq. ft (22)

Divide Line 21 by Line 22, multiply by 100%

_______ %(23)

Total janitorial expense (Line 19 X Line 20 X Line 23)

$________ (24)

TOTAL PERSONNEL EXPENSES (Add Lines 5, 10, 16, 24)

$________ (24a)

Prescription Department Operating Expenses
Prescription filling expenses
Prescription containers, labels, bags
$________ (25)
Value of computer(s) dedicated to prescription department $________ (26)
Other prescription filling expenses (Specify:__________________ )_$_________ (27)
TOTAL PRESCRIPTION FILLING EXPENSES

$________ (28)

Professional expenses
Pharmacist/Technician license/registration fees paid by
business
Pharmacy association dues paid by business
Professional journal subscriptions paid for by business
Fee for pharmacy permit (1 year)

$________ (29)
$________ (30)
$________ (31 )
$________ (32)
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DBA license fee (1 year)
$________ (33)
Professional books used in pharmacy
$________ (34)
Other professional expenses
(Specify:_______________________ )___________ $_________ (35)
TOTAL PROFESSIONAL EXPENSES

$________ (35a)

Travel to professional meetings (for CE programs)

$________ (36)

D Dedicated prescription department telephone(s) ("MBs' line”) $_________ (37)
Non-salary delivery expenses
Vehicle depreciation or reimbursement to employee
Insurance
Fuel
OU
Repairs
Maintenance
Taxi/Courier service
Total vehicle expenses (Total Lines 38-44)
Estimated % of dehveries which contain at
least one prescription (Line 15)

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

.. .

(38)
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
%(46)

TOTAL VEHICLE EXPENSES FOR PRESCRIPTION
DELIVERY SERVICE (Line 45 X Line 46)

$_______ (47)

Advertising for prescription department (products and services)

$_______ (48)

Professional attire laundering and dry cleaning paid by store

$_______ (49)

Shared expenses
Total rent*_________________________________________ $________ (50)
Utilities
$________ (51)
Accounting fees
$________ (52)
Legal fees
$_________(53)
Taxes
$_________(54)
Insurance
$_________(55)
Interest payments
$_________(56)
Miscellaneous expenses
$_________(57)
Manager’s total compensation not allocated to prescription
department._____________________________________________ $_________(5g)
Total expenses____________________________________________ $_________( 5 9 )
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TOTAL SHARED EXPENSES CHARGED TO
PRESCRIPTION DEPARTMENT
(LINE 58 X LINE 23)_______________________________$_________ (60)
*If you own the building, estimate what your monthly rent would have been.

Ill Cost to Dispense an Rx
Add Lines 24a, 35a, 36, 37, 47, 48, 49, 60

$________(61)

For 3”*party prescription expenses
If you submit billings for third-party prescriptions by computer,
enter the transmittal fee for each 3rd party prescription
processed
If you transmit prescription billings through more than one
carrier, and these carriers charge different transmittal
fees, calculate a weighted average transmittal fee:

$________(62)

For each carrier, multiply the transmittal fee charged per
prescription by the number of prescriptions processed by
that carrier
Total the amounts obtained in ‘a’ above for all carriers
Divide the number obtained in ‘b’ above by the total number
of all third party prescriptions transmitted. This will give you
the weighted average transmittal fee.
Multiply the number calculated from ‘c’ above by the number of
third party prescriptions you filled last year. Enter this number in
Line 62.
- OR If you do not submit claims by computer, multiply the number of third party prescriptions
you filled last year by $1.50. (Based upon a Purdue University study of the cost of handprocessing a 3rd party prescription, adjusted for inflation.)
Enter this number in Line 62.
Enter the total number of prescriptions you filled last year.
Calculate the cost o f dispensing each prescription (Add Lines 61
and 62, Divide the sum by Line 63)

Rxs (63)

$_______ /Rx (64)
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PHARMACY NAME
NAME OF PERSON COMPLETING CALCULATIONS:
Thanks very much for completing these calculations. Please forward a copy of this
worksheet to Tim Stratton or Lori Morin, School of Pharmacy, The University of
Montana, Missoula, MT 59812. This worksheet may be returned with along your first
batch of cash prescription data sheets if you wish.

N

in

Appendix 2:
Cash Prescription Data Sheet
Pharmacy Name: ________
Script
Number

1

Is Drug
Brand or
Generic?
^ Brand

Drug Name and
Strength

Drug
Manufacturer

NDC Number

Quantity
Dispensed

0 Generic
^ Brand

2

^ Generic
0 Brand

3

0 Generic
□ Brand

4

□ Generic
□ Brand

5

-

□ Generic
□ Brand

6

□ Generic

Package
Size

Pharmacy
Cost /pkg.

Price to
Patient
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